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As usual, Andrew Abbott helps social scientists to improve their approach to
empirical work, suggesting witty remarks on sensitive aspects of social theory. His
paper considerably encourages us to advance and fill the gap between social theory
and empirical research. Glad of this opportunity to dialogue with Abbott, I will
stress my comments in the form of questions, trying also to open some new heuristic
suggestions. A point, the latter, that we know Abbott [2004] is particularly keen
about.
xOn Micro-foundations and Interaction Mechanisms
The mechanism position proposed by Hedström and Swedberg [1998] com-
bines different foundational principles: the analytical idea of dissection, the pursue
of explanation, an orientation towards abstraction and a strong reference to a theory
of action. Surely, the Hedström and Swedberg position is not the only one in social
sciences that valorises an explication based on mechanisms. Another well-known re-
search program that makes reference to (generative) mechanisms is the “contentious
politics” approach launched by Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly
[2001] and largely influential in political studies. On the whole, explanation by mech-
anisms does not necessarily involve either an individualistic perspective or a micro-
founded one [Ballarino 2005]. The distinctiveness of the Hedström and Swedberg
position is to be deeply influenced by the work of James Coleman, i.e. to situate itself
within methodological individualism.
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Abbott prefers to underline and criticise the place and relevance of rational
choice in the mechanism position, and to dig into the advancements of methodolo-
gical individualism that the Hedström and Swedberg proposal implies. However, it
seems to me that Abbott does not fully recognise that Hedström and Swedberg de-
velop methodological individualism to better take into account structural constraints
[Hedström 2005]. Following the well-known Coleman’s Boat schema, the Hedström
and Swedberg proposal aims not to cancel supra-individual dimensions from explan-
ation processes but to underline the impossibility of casting an explanation without re-
curring also to some form of causality enacted by interactions at a micro level [Barbera
2004].
xOn the Relational Character of the Explanatory Process
There is certain panoply of relational approaches. Let us first consider the re-
lational position of Pierre Bourdieu. The affinity and differences with the paradigm
built by Pierre Bourdieu are acknowledged and well documented by Abbott [2003]
himself. If we look at Abbott’s works on profession [Abbott 1988] or on the history
of sociology [Abbott 2001a], we see how he insists “on what happens at the fronti-
ers between different bodies of expertise” [Dezalay 1992, 38]. In a different way, in
Bourdieu’s relational sociology, especially after the turning point represented by La
distinction [Bourdieu 1979], the key concept of “field” is a “given thing, changing in
the mechanical, structural manner produced by the successive oppositions” [Abbott
2005a, 7]. Bourdieu’s relational theory has become increasingly static, lacking the
possibility of history, “the degree to which all structures, however small or large, must
ford the desperate waters of the present on their way into the future” [ibidem].
On the contrary, the relational position outlined by Abbott in this paper, and
highly developed in his successive works [2001b; 2003; 2007] tries to sum and com-
bine two possible meanings of the adjective “relational”: structural and interactional.
Abbot does this in a very disctinctive way. As he explicitly says in the paper, the
relational view implies “that the meaning of an action is comprehensible only when
it is situated in social time and place”. In this sense, Abbott’s relational view focuses
on the meaning of an action and takes for granted that it is not absolute: it emerges
from its relations with other actions.
Notably, for Abbott the meaning of an action is defined 1) temporally, within
sequences of events [Abbott 1992], and 2) structurally, as he says in the paper, as a
“vertex in a synchronic ensemble of actions”. We can say that, according to Abbott,
interactions allow to articulate and bring together structure and temporality, which
Sociologica, 2/2007
3
was exactly the missing point in Bourdieu’s theory of fields. The clever example of
college choice plainly proves it.
This is a very important result for sociological theory. However it seems to
me that in Abbott’s works the search for interaction and identity is coupled with
the risk of missing an important element that, conversely, was strongly stressed in
Bourdieu’s work. In my opinion, in Abbott’s paper the hard side of the social world,
made by power relationships between actors, and obviously among cliques, is not
completely emphasised. I am sure that, at least partly, this is partly accountable to
the fact that length of this paper does not allow to present all the levels of analysis
arguably developed by Abbott [on this point, see for instance Abbott 2005b]. Partly,
however it also depends on the fact that some points are underdeveloped in Abbott’s
view.
Let us briefly consider the main example that Abbott offers us. I completely
agree with Abbott’s argument: college choice is not just a matter of individuals making
decisions: college choice is “a language by which cliques talk to cliques.” Of course,
Abbott clarifies that when people create their identities via college choice, they do
“not have completely free hands in the process.” This implies that analysis should
begin by describing the social structure of choices, then it should try to understand
the situational conditions in which a clique attains the capacity to affect, shape and/or
determine the choices of its constituents.
My main criticism is that Abbott does not elaborate a language that distinguishes
the different kinds of devices that support and structure interaction. In fact, I guess
that to reinforce and refine relational explanations we have to consider what are the
“tests” actors face up to, and deal with within the configuration of interactions. I
think that for the relational view it could be useful to look at the approach developed
in 1999 by Boltanski and Chiapello [and, beforehand, by Boltanski and Thévenot,
1991]. This approach comes to my mind simply because it is one of the most eminent
attempts to escape from the limits of Bourdieu’s tradition, exactly on the points
singled out by Abbott himself.
xOn Legitimacy
Let us consider interactions as supported by tests where people confront them-
selves and their identities, deciding who they want to be, who they want affiliate with
and who they want to distinguish from. Following this definition, we can say that
interactions, and also interactions among cliques, can be institutionalised. A test is a
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kind of situation that performs an order among participants, like a school entry test
that produces a hierarchy of admission.
As Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello [1999] said, a test is always a test of
strength. Yet a test can be considered to be legitimate as long as strengths are being
measured according to the tenets of the particular order of worth within which it
falls [Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Stark 2000]. A legitimate test must always test
something that has been already defined, presenting itself as a test of something: for
example, in college a history testing device is arranged to verify the knowledge of
history and not to call upon the use of any other kind of strength (social capital,
reputation, family belonging, economic capital, beauty, and so on).1 By contrast with
a legitimate test, “it is acceptable in a test of strength to mobilize any and all kinds of
strength. Nothing is specified beforehand. Anything goes, as long as it is crowned with
success. In a legitimate test, on the other hand, everything is not possible” [Boltanski
and Chiapello 2005].2 In this formulation, tests of strength and legitimate tests should
not be constructed as standalone entities which exist in opposition to one another.
There is a continuum between the two, leading to a situation in which tests are seen
as being more or less fair [Boltanski, Chiapello and Vitale 2007].
It seems to me that the main contribution of Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach
is to force us to re-introduce a sensibility into legitimacy processes when we construct
our explanations. In my opinion, there is something missing both in mechanism and
in relational positions: it is the problem of legitimacy, as Max Weber posed it. Legit-
imating processes are not stressed in analytical approaches. Methodological individu-
alism expelled the issue, its reference to Weber as founding father notwithstanding.
Moreover, most relational views refer to Simmel without considering his position on
legitimacy. Generally speaking, reflection on legitimacy seems to be debarred from
approaches that look directly at patterns of activity, as Abbott [1992; 1995] says,
moving “from causes to events,” and involving methods aimed at structural patterns,
x
1 Whereas people have to face a legitimate test, actions are publicly judged by other people, basing
upon certain explicit and acknowledged principles of equivalency [Boltanski and Vitale, 2006], many
of which are legally enforced. These judgment criteria are orders of worth, kind of social conventions
that transcend the confrontational situation [Borghi and Vitale 2006]. In my judgment this implies
that such conventions can be envisaged regardless of the specific situations in which they are acted
out. This is a typical structuralist position (structuralist à la Lévi-Strauss) that I am not sure Abbott
will admit, even if his development of a “lyrical sociology” [Abbott 2007] seems to go, surely with
important differences, in the same direction.
2 During tests of strength, the forces acting on the situation are completely immanent, depending
on local circumstances, and this does not require anyone to make a judgment. No external social
convention is mobilised and relationships among actors are flows which require just a limited amount
of reflexivity. Precisely, it is not necessary referring to some equivalency convention to legitimise (or
to criticise) a particular social order.
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on the one hand, and aimed at regularities in processes, on the other. The result
is an inclination to view almost only the instrumental side of social interaction. In
the mechanism position, Coleman and his theory of social norms is emblematic: the
normative dimension of interaction is reduced to a question of control over the ac-
tions of others. Empirical research on legitimating processes becomes a field only for
political scientists or for what Raymond Boudon [2002] labels “expressive sociology.”
In my opinion, the relational position (as well as the mechanism position) would
gain substantially if it were to import the theme of legitimacy and to elaborate it,
simply to overcome some of the aporias that the well-known Weber definition left
unresolved. I deem reflecting on legitimacy as a way to include the institutional di-
mension of structured interactions or, in other words, to take into account the ways in
which interactions are structured and supported by (more or less) legitimate devices.
At the same time, I see mulling over legitimacy as a path to take into account tests
of strengths and power asymmetries. Finally, I believe it is a means to multiply heur-
istics on how to empirically study and theoretically elaborate the relation between
structure and action – notably to describe structure starting from action and activity
rather than from static data.
I recognise that this theory is just one particular way to include legitimacy into a
relation position. I however think that it is useful to point out some general thoughts
about Abbott’s paper. If we look at the different kinds of tests that sustain and struc-
ture interactions, it could be easier to carry out two delicate theoretical operations:
1) a better articulation of micro and macro levels of analysis – because focusing on
the institutional dimension of tests allows one to pass from a situational analysis to a
macro level of analysis; 2) a better articulation of the relationships between interac-
tion, identity seeking, and legitimating processes. I prefer not to enter into the first
one, which is not a concern of Abbott’s paper and which is already well known. The
second one is more significant. In the next paragraph I will try to stress the import-
ance of considering different kinds of test that support interaction to better analyse
identity seeking in relational explanations.
xInteraction, Legitimate Devices, and Identity Politics
Going back to the example of college choice, it seems to me that what is most
important for Abbott is the articulation between a relational configuration and what
he defines “identity politics”. Abbott talks of identity politics referring to the rela-
tional articulations of different identity processes circumscribed, at its boundaries,
by hints of rational constraint. My point is that the recognition that the ways in which
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people interact are structured by devices with different degrees of legitimacy allows
to better articulate these identity processes.
Sometimes, in Abbott’s paper, there is the risk of falling into a voluntaristic
vision of identity choice. I know that this is not Abbott’s position, and that in all his
works he always rejects it, but I assume it is a recurring temptation in the construction
of a relational explanation. Abbott explicitly says “that identity is largely made by
making meaningful connections and disconnections between self and various other
groups.” But, at same time, it is very difficult to develop some kind of methodology
without falling into a voluntaristic approach to individual choice. In Italy we are well
aware of this kind of problems thanks to the works of Alberto Melucci [1996] and
Alessandro Pizzorno [2007].
In my judgment, considering different degrees of tests’ legitimacy permits to
better acknowledge how these “meaningful connections and disconnections” give
birth to various configurations: 1) being (individually or collectively) chosen to ob-
tain recognition and distinguish themselves; 2) being obtained by legitimate test; 3)
being imposed by tests of strength which deny recognition (what is usually called the
reification of an identity); 4) being a combination of these three. Developing similar
kind of distinction can help to articulate relational positions and to strive “making
interaction primitive.”
I wish to thank Michela Barbot and Laura Centemeri for their critics to a previous version of this
paper.
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Mechanisms and Relations
Abstract: Reacting to the original papers outlining the importance of “social mechanisms,” this
paper contrasts two views of the social process, the mechanismal and the relational. In the sources
here analyzed, the mechanismal perspective is largely based on methodological individualism
and generally presupposes rational, or at least intentional, action. A fundamental assumption of
this approach is that the meaning of an action is given in itself. The relational view by contrast
holds that the meaning of an action arises only from its relation to other actions, both temporally
and structurally. The relational view takes not actors but interaction as primitive and focuses
on the scene (context) of action rather than the intentions of actors. The paper investigates
these differences by examining the Elsterian mechanisms of “endowment” and “contrast,”
both theoretically and through the example of application of students to institutions of higher
education in America.
Keywords: legitimacy, relational explanation, identity, institution, convention.
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